What if Berkeley Had Gone to Berkeley?

What if Berkeley Had Gone to Berkeley? - Neurophysiology & Physics in the Defense of Informational Idealism: Part I: The Problem of Experience (by Paul N. Seward): Our argument is divided into two parts. In this Part I, we stipulate and defend the existence of an experiencing subject or “self” that is not identical to consciousness but for whom consciousness is an objective experience. We then show that the relationship of time and space to moving objects requires that the self cannot be a part of space-time or made of matter and energy. http://jcer.com/index.php/jcj/article/view/222

What if Berkeley Had Gone to Berkeley? - Neurophysiology & Physics in the Defense of Informational Idealism: Part II: Informational Reality (by Paul N. Seward): Our argument is divided into two parts. In this Part 2, we describe the actual relationship of the self to the universe and to the brain as that of a primary independent reality to a secondary dependent reality, one whose nature is informational, not material. Evidence for this hypothesis is developed from the nature of the laws of physics and of elementary particles. Finally we evaluate these hypotheses on the basis of two categories: simplicity; and their ability to provide simple solutions to hitherto unsolved problems of physics and philosophy. http://jcer.com/index.php/jcj/article/view/223